

Measuring political accountability in Africa using a multi-item index

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Abstract

This paper examines political accountability in Africa since the fight against corruption began to gain traction in the continent during the 1990s. The standpoint adopted here is that well-functioning political accountability depends on three key factors: the prominence of civil society in governance; the existence of sanctions for the abuse of public office; and lastly, media impartiality. Given these indicators, a multi-item index measuring and ranking political accountability in 54 African countries was constructed using data from the 2020 Ibrahim Index of African Governance. I found that on the index, Eritrea ranked lowest and Mauritius highest, while West Africa had more high scorers, Southern Africa had mixed results and Middle Africa and North Africa were worse off. Overall, from the index, political accountability in Africa is brittle. While this fragility is not tantamount to a lack of progress in the fight against corruption in the continent, the article recommends that regional and continental stakeholders should design and implement carefully tailored anti-graft programmes and that national governments should strengthen the administrative capabilities of anti-graft agencies to ensure greater accountability in the implementation of anti-graft projects.

Key words: Accountability; governance; corruption; Africa; multi-item index; principal-agent model; democracy; civil society; sanctions; media impartiality; Eritrea; Mauritius.

Introduction

The aim of this paper was to develop a multi-item index measuring government-to-citizen accountability in Africa. Various initiatives at national, regional, and international levels since the 1990s have drawn attention to the question

of government accountability in Africa. The existence of accountable, efficient domestic political institutions – that is, governments that operate under the principles of good governance and the rule of law, and in which policymakers and bureaucrats are not influenced by graft – has been shown to contribute to greater levels of country development and citizen wellbeing (Knack & Philip, 1995; Mauro, 1995; Easterly & Ross, 1997; Kaufmann *et al.*, 1995). While countries can have strong, accountable domestic political institutions without democracy, it is assumed here for normative reasons that the role of accountability in ensuring good governance and achieving wellbeing and overall development is better framed in the light of democratic values.

The concept of democracy has been assigned a range of definitions in an extensive literature (Dahl, 2000; Lijphart, 1999; Chikwema, 2018). However, central to its definitions is a focus on individuals or the citizenry: that is, a form of government originating from the people and exercised in their interests. The concept, therefore, involves an implicit requirement that political institutions must create avenues by which public officials can be held accountable for their conduct in office as representatives of the interests of citizens. Government accountability to the citizenry, then, depends on the existence of appropriate institutions that ensure civil participation in government, mechanisms to sanction various kinds of improper conduct by those in government, and transparency in government (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2020, p. 143). Government accountability also depends to some extent on the participation of an active, thriving and organised civil society in political affairs at various levels (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2020, p. 143). These institutions represent a range of democratic values, including citizen participation, government accountability and institutional transparency. The principles of governance, which include participation, efficiency, efficacy, a sense of accountability and responsibility, and the act of reporting, complement these democratic values (Chikwema, 2018, p. 54).

In a nutshell, government accountability to citizens requires that the state provide justifications for its actions and that the judiciary or citizenry are able to sanction such actions when required. Corruption in African countries has been traced to low levels of accountability in government, which encourages the use of power for private purposes and impedes socioeconomic growth and wellbeing (African Union, 2003, p. 2). The actualisation, respect, and consolidation of these key democratic values build strong accountability mechanisms in government-citizen dealings.

In 2003, the African Union ratified the African Union Convention to Prevent and Combat Corruption in Africa. This agreement aims to identify, foster,

and strengthen the procedures that the public and private sectors in African countries require to prevent corruption and associated crime (African Union, 2003, pp. 5-6). At the national level, many African countries have developed initiatives to combat corruption and strengthen accountability mechanisms in society, in which a trend toward the establishment of anti-corruption bodies is most widespread. However, whether these are always independent is debatable.

Regionally, there have been serious efforts to roll back graft. Most prominent in West Africa is the dedication of considerable efforts and resources by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) towards protecting democracy, epitomised by their fight against military coups and rolling back dictatorships in the region (Campbell & Quinn, 2021). Part of the idea behind this initiative is to cripple authoritarian or repressive regimes, which are often characterised by high levels of corruption. In Southern Africa, there is the 2001 SADC Protocol Against Corruption which, *inter alia*, aims to foster and reinforce the systems needed to detect, prevent, sanction, and eliminate corruption in both the public and private sectors within each member state (Southern African Development Community, 2014). Despite these efforts and initiatives at combating graft and poor accountability, examples of the political abuse of power in Africa are still legion (Chirwa & Nijzink, 2012; Transparency International, 2019; Keulder, 2021).

The brief account above of the efforts to tackle low levels of accountability and combat corruption in Africa, whether sincere and consistent or rhetorical and piecemeal, raises questions that this paper aims to address. For example, what is the state of political accountability in Africa since the fight against corruption gained momentum in the 1990s? How do African countries and sub-regions rank comparatively on political accountability since this fight gained traction? Scholars such as Adsera *et al.* (2003) and Bratton & Logan (2008) have paid attention to why democracy (particularly representative elections) has not brought about improved political accountability in Africa. However, studies integrating key aspects of the accountability relationship in assessing political accountability in contemporary Africa in the context of the numerous anti-graft initiatives are scanty. Unless political accountability in Africa is assessed to understand the efficacy of the fight against graft and weak accountability systems, the impact of such efforts on the continent will not be fully realised or understood.

The research questions are addressed by constructing a multi-item index measuring political accountability (governments' accountability to the citizenry) in 54 African countries, using cross-sectional data from the 2020 Ibrahim Index

of African Governance (IIAG) published by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2021).

A multi-item index of political accountability based on the principal-agent model allows the measurement of political accountability on a national, subregional and continental level by integrating multiple indicators that correlatively and causally explain the concept of political accountability. In choosing the component measures, the extent to which the indicators are positively correlated as well as causally prior to the principal-agent model was considered to ensure there were no negative correlations or correlations near zero. The identified relationship was further subjected to a reliability and common variance test to ensure that the index was highly valid and reliable in explaining the subject matter of this research. The analysis was performed using the R statistical software version 4.0.4.

The study results are provided in this paper, which is divided into six parts. This section, the introduction, has sketched the empirical and theoretical context of the study. Part two provides a review of the principal-agent theory, the theoretical framework underpinning this study. The component measures are explained in part three and further diagnosed for reliability in part four. The core of the paper is presented in part five, which outlines the construction of the multi-item index and the presentation of findings. Lastly, part six presents a concluding discussion.

Principal-agent theory as a driver of political accountability

The study is underpinned by the principal-agent theory, which postulates that political accountability can be explained in terms of the connections between the citizenry (the principal) and the government or public officials (the agent). In much of the literature on political accountability, the concept is understood as a game between a principal and an agent in which the former hands over a set of instruments to the latter to carry out certain goals on the principal's behalf. The principal-agent theory emphasises the institutional methods through which principals can monitor and ensure the compliance of their agents, as well as the obstacles involved in this process (Kinyondo *et al.*, 2015). Fukuyama (2004), for example, used the principal-agent connection to explain public behaviour, arguing that in a democratic setting the public should be understood as the principals and their elected representatives as their agents. The theory, therefore, provides a useful analytical framework for examining, measuring, and ranking political accountability systems in African countries as well as an effective way of evaluating the extent to which institutions in African countries are successful in ensuring accountability.

Practically, however, the principal-agent relationship may not be as simple as might be concluded from the above outline. This is shown, for example, in the corruption and inefficiencies which arise when individual agents advance their own interests ahead of those of their principals, especially when structural gaps in the regulatory or monitoring system incentivise them to do so (Chikwema, 2018; Adsera *et al.*, 2003). This, therefore, makes it vital for principals to keep an eye on their agents. The solution to this malfeasance, in which agents (public officials) derail from service to principals (the public) to pursue their own agenda, lies in setting up a public control mechanism to control and sanction the actions of agents when required (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986).

As highlighted in the component measures below, in a principal-agent model, the effectiveness of any control mechanism relies on three related factors: how active and prominent civil society is in governance; the impartiality of media information; and the ability of the public to effectively sanction the abuse of office by officials. First, political accountability is expected to be lower in societies experiencing civil society repression and where civil society organisations do not thrive, such as in dictatorships. As Adsera *et al.* (2003) have highlighted, although authoritarian governments ultimately rely on the active aid of some social sectors or on some implicit tolerance or minimum population agreement, dictators use oppressive measures to suppress civil society and keep themselves in power; therefore, the cost of ousting a dictatorship exceeds the effort required to get rid of the ruler. Repression is thus used by authoritarian regimes as a tool to weaken political accountability and advance political anomalies, such as the misappropriation of funds, which impede accountability mechanisms.

Moreover, the extent to which the media can report government corruption and mismanagement without fear or favour also determines the effectiveness of a control mechanism in the principal-agent theory. Citizens' access to informative and impartial knowledge and understanding of both the policies and programmes of public officials, policymakers and state institutions should enhance their ability to detect, react to and sanction political corruption and hold officials accountable. This should in turn reduce, *inter alia*, the misappropriation of resources by officials. Unless measures are in place to sanction the abuse of office by public officials, corruption in government is bound to take place.

Component measures: determinants of political accountability

Scholarly research proposes several indicators that may influence whether policymakers and public officials participate in inappropriate or inefficient conduct. These indicators help in understanding the drivers of political behaviour that weaken accountability mechanisms and, more generally, government

performance. In this section, the indicators that were selected for this study are explained in preparation for the extensive diagnosis and construction that were performed in the subsequent sections.

The possibility that public officials might abuse their powers for private gain has been largely attributed to the civil society landscape that exists in a country (Neff, 2017). In particular, political accountability is often undermined in the absence of appropriate types of cooperative associations and interest groups in civil society. Interest groups are known to be strong advocates of sociopolitical issues (Dür & De Bièvre, 2007). This indicator, therefore, assesses the extent to which there is a network of interest groups or cooperative associations to mediate between society and the political system (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2021). In this study, the indicator is labelled “CoopAssIntGrBS”. Civil society organisations often play a role as representatives of the citizenry and therefore serve as a link between public officials and the citizenry. The linkage can occur through active consultations between government and civil society organisations, or it can take other forms, such as the publication of opinion articles and research information that place issues on the social agenda or provide new information about them. On the principal-agent model, such linkages can contribute to better governance; thus, an indicator reflecting this is included in the index. The measure assesses the extent to which major civil society organisations (CSOs) are routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2021). In this study, the indicator is labelled “CSOConsVDEM”.

As already noted, the presence of an active, unrepressed civil society is likely to correlate with lower levels of abuses of office by public officials in a democratic setting. This factor is a third indicator of the principal-agent model and is therefore also included in the index. This measure assesses the extent to which government attempts to repress CSOs (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2021). In this study, the indicator is labelled “AbsCSORepVDEM”.

Sanctions for misconduct or abuse of office are at the heart of political accountability and are therefore included in the index. Accountability is incomplete without enforceability, which ensures that public officials can face sanctions if they fail to meet standards of ethical and professional behaviour. This component measure, then, assesses the extent to which public officeholders who abuse their positions are sanctioned through legal prosecution and public contempt (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2021; Bratton & Logan, 2008). In this study, the indicator is labelled “SancMisAbOffBS”.

Finally, media impartiality is key to ensuring a flow of information to the citizenry, enabling them to judge the performance of political actors.

Accountability often thrives in political systems where mass media is not controlled by or biased towards any political party, public official, group or individual in reporting government activities to the citizenry. As such, this component measure assesses the extent to which the media is (a) unbiased in coverage or lack of coverage of the opposition, (b) allowed to be critical of the regime, and a conveyor of a wide array of political perspectives (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2021). In this study, the indicator is labelled “MediaImpVDEM”.

Diagnosing component measures

TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF COMPONENT MEASURES

Indicators	n	mean	sd	min	max	range	skew	kurtosis	se
SancMisAboffBS	50.00	3.74	1.34	1.00	7.00	6.00	0.02	0.44	0.19
CoopAssIntGrBS	50.00	4.68	1.86	1.00	8.00	7.00	0.03	-0.74	0.26
CsoConsVDE	54.00	0.97	0.48	0.06	1.85	1.79	-0.06	-0.97	0.07
AbsCSORepVDEM	54.00	2.46	0.93	0.40	3.89	3.50	-0.38	-0.97	0.13
MediaImpVDEM	54.00	0.65	0.23	0.03	0.90	0.87	-1.34	0.75	0.03

TABLE 2: CORRELATION MATRIX OF COMPONENT MEASURES

Indicators	SancMisAboffBS	CoopAssIntGrBS	CsoConsVDEM	AbsCSORepVDEM	MediaImpVDEM
SancMisAboffBS	1.00	0.68	0.52	0.70	0.56
CoopAssIntGrBS	0.68	1.00	0.51	0.62	0.56
CsoConsVDE	0.52	0.51	1.00	0.78	0.58
AbsCSORepVDEM	0.70	0.62	0.78	1.00	0.70
MediaImpVDEM	0.56	0.56	0.58	0.70	1.00

TABLE 3: CRONBACH’S- α RELIABILITY ANALYSIS

raw_alpha	std. alpha	G6(smc)	average_r	S/N	ase	mean	sd	median_r
0.79	0.89	0.88	0.62	8.3	0.029	2.4	0.83	0.6
lower	alpha	upper	95% confidence boundaries					
0.73	0.79	0.84						

Reliability if an item is dropped:

	raw_alpha	std. alpha	G6(smc)	average_r	S/N	alpha se	var.r	med.r
SancMisAboffBS	0.67	0.87	0.85	0.62	6.7	0.04	0.01	0.60

CoopAssIntGrBS	0.76	0.88	0.86	0.64	7.1	0.03	0.01	0.63
CsoConsVDEM	0.77	0.88	0.85	0.64	7.1	0.03	0.00	0.65
AbsCSORepVDEM	0.69	0.85	0.81	0.58	5.5	0.04	0.00	0.57
MedialmpVDEM	0.80	0.88	0.86	0.64	7.0	0.03	0.01	0.65
Item statistics								
	n	raw.r	std.r	r.cor	r.drop	mean	sd	
SancMisAboffBS	50	0.88	0.83	0.78	0.76	3.74	1.34	
CoopAssIntGrBS	50	0.90	0.81	0.74	0.71	4.68	1.86	
CsoConsVDEM	54	0.68	0.81	0.76	0.66	0.97	0.48	
AbsCSORepVDEM	54	0.74	0.90	0.89	0.77	2.46	0.93	
MedialmpVDEM	54	0.65	0.82	0.75	0.69	0.65	0.23	

TABLE 4: PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS

	PC1	PC2	PC3	PC4	PC5
SancMisAboffBS	-0.44	-0.48	0.22	-0.64	0.33
CoopAssIntGrBS	-0.43	-0.57	0.03	0.70	-0.08
CsoConsVDEM	-0.43	0.59	0.43	0.25	0.47
AbsCSORepVDEM	-0.49	0.24	0.16	-0.20	-0.80
MedialmpVDEM	-0.43	0.20	-0.86	-0.05	0.17
Importance of components					
	PC1	PC2	PC3	PC4	PC5
Std deviation	1.87	0.77	0.65	0.57	0.40
Proportion of variance	0.70	0.12	0.08	0.07	0.03
Cumulative proportion	0.70	0.82	0.90	0.97	1.00

Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the component measures used in the analysis. Table 2 displays the correlation coefficients for all variables. Table 3 diagnoses the reliability of the model using Cronbach's reliability analysis. Table 4 checks for common variance using the principal component analysis. The diagnosis did not reveal any reason not to combine the indicators of political accountability. The skew and kurtosis values in Table 1 show that the distributions in the component measures are not highly skewed to require transformation

for multivariate normality. This is also reflected in the low standard deviation for each indicator. Further, there exists a fair, positive correlation among the component measures in Table 2; high raw alpha from the Cronbach’s reliability analysis in Table 3; and a common variance from the principal component analysis in Table 4. These details, therefore, signal that the component measures can be combined.

Constructing the index

As noted, the diagnosis did not reveal any reasons not to combine the indicators of political accountability. The variables were therefore combined to construct the government-citizen accountability index. To do this, the min-max scale was first used in transforming the measures to a common scale within the bounds of 0.0 to 1.0. Countries with higher values on the scale are therefore reflected as more accountable. For the common scale transformation, the following formula was used: $x = (\text{actual value} - \text{minimum raw value}) / (\text{maximum raw value} - \text{minimum raw value})$. The “Raw Data Potential Range” for each of the indicators in the IIAG2020 metadata was used in determining the minimum and maximum raw values. The unweighted arithmetic mean of the rescaled indicators was, thereafter, calculated to create the government-citizen accountability index (GCAIndex) for the 54 African countries included in the IIAG dataset. It is worth noting that Cabo Verde, Comoros, São Tomé and Príncipe and Seychelles were automatically excluded from the index because they had missing values in some of the selected indicators.

TABLE 5: SUMMARY STATISTICS: GCA INDEX

vars	n	mean	sd	min	max	range	se	IQR
1	50	0.49	0.18	0.05	0.79	2.4	0.03	0.26

The ranking in Figure 1 as well as the summary statistics in Table 5 reveal that Mauritius has the most robust government-to-citizen accountability mechanisms in Africa, having ranked highest on the index. Although bedevilled by some deficiencies in its practice of political accountability, such as inefficiencies in tackling some major cases of corruption, this island country has been able to create an enabling environment that ensures civil society is prominent in governance and the efficient operation of the principal-agent model. The results also lend credence to the body of literature that associates the country with good governance (Freedom House, 2021a; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2021). Mauritius was trailed by Tunisia and Burkina Faso on the index.

FIGURE 1: RANKING OF POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES





FIGURE 2: RANKING OF POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES¹



¹ Africa's regions obtained from the United Nations (UN) geoscheme (available with the R countrycode package). It is worth noting that since the dataset for the UN became readily available, the regional groups of the UN geoscheme have been used for the mapping instead of the African Union's.

Eritrea scored lowest on the index, just before Equatorial Guinea and South Sudan. This could be attributable to weak political institutions and structures, particularly in Eritrea. The latter, which is currently a militarised authoritarian state, has been devoid of national elections since 1993 and ranks low on other indicators of political accountability (Connell, 2011; Freedom House, 2021b; World Bank, 2021).

Figure 2 presents a map of the GCAIndex scores across African countries (alongside a map of Africa's subregions) to display the scores of the African sub-regions on the constructed index. Countries that scored below the mean of 0.49 were represented on the map as low. Countries that scored above the mean to the third quartile of 0.61 (the value under which 75% of data points are found) were represented as medium and countries that scored above the third quartile were represented as high on the map. From the results, and based on this classification, most of the countries in the high category were in West Africa. This could be attributed to the many efforts and resources dedicated by ECOWAS to supporting democracy in the region (Campbell & Quinn, 2021). Southern Africa on the other hand had two countries in the high category while all Middle/Central African countries (apart from Gabon) and all North African countries (apart from Tunisia) had low levels of political accountability since they were below the mean.

The mean of 0.49 (approximately 0.5) in Table 5 suggests that overall, government-citizen accountability in Africa is brittle despite the emphasis since the 1990s on promoting political accountability by combating corruption. This is not to say that there have been no improvements in political accountability since the fight against corruption gained traction in the continent, but the fragility of political accountability in Africa given three decades of fighting graft calls for concern. Clearly, the accumulated anti-graft initiatives are not meeting the goal of eradicating the abuse of political power and strengthening accountability mechanisms in Africa. One possible explanation is that such initiatives, while good on paper, may be met by weak institutional mechanisms, which limits the capacity to implement policy initiatives. Other limiting factors could include institutional failure, administrative incompetence, resource inadequacy, and the holistic development and implementation of anti-graft initiatives at regional and continental levels.

TABLE 6: CORRELATION MATRIX: COMPONENT MEASURES WITH GCA INDEX

	GCA Index	SancMisAboffBSI	CoopAssIntGrBSI	CsoConsVDEMI	AbsCSORepVDEMI	MedialImpVDEMI
GCA Index	1.00	0.79	0.79	0.83	0.92	0.82
SancMisAboffBSI	0.79	1.00	0.68	0.52	0.70	0.56
CoopAssIntGrBSI	0.79	0.68	1.00	0.51	0.62	0.56
CsoConsVDEMI	0.83	0.52	0.51	1.00	0.78	0.58
AbsCSORepVDEMI	0.92	0.70	0.62	0.78	1.00	0.70
MedialImpVDEMI	0.82	0.56	0.56	0.58	0.70	1.00

TABLE 7: VALIDITY CHECK WITH OTHER POSSIBLE INDICATORS OF ACCOUNTABILITY

	GCA Index	CitCompMechWJP	AssDisGovGI	PercAccOffAFR
GCA Index	1.00	0.47	0.32	0.26
CitCompMechWJP	0.47	1.00	0.29	0.01
AssDisGovGI	0.32	0.29	1.00	-0.05
PercAccOffAFR	0.26	0.01	-0.05	1.00

The correlation matrix in Table 6 reveals the relationship between the index and its component measures. It can be concluded from the results that the GCA Index, as expected, is highly correlated with its component measures. The index scores were put on a common scale within the bounds of 0.0 to 1.0. Values for Cabo Verde, Comoros, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Seychelles were missing, and these countries were therefore not included, as noted. The missing data in these cases were related to the “cooperative associations and interest groups” as well as the “sanctions for misconduct and abuse of office” component measures.

In Table 7, the validity of the GCA Index was determined using other possible indicators of accountability not included in the index. These indicators were not included in the index because the correlation coefficient, Cronbach’s reliability analysis, and the principal component analysis used in the study did not recommend their inclusion. The results from the validity check reveal that the perceived accountability of officials (PercAccOffAFR) variable, the citizen complaint mechanisms (CitCompMechWJP) variable and the asset disclosure in government (AssDisGovGI) variable were all positively correlated with the constructed Government-Citizen Accountability Index (GCA Index), with CitCompMechWJP being more strongly correlated on that list and

PercAccOffAFR more weakly correlated. This, therefore, strengthens the validity of the constructed index. The results, however, reveal that PercAccOffAFR was negatively and poorly correlated with other variables in the matrix, which raises the question of whether it should be combined at all with the rest of the variables.

Conclusion

In this analysis, and having established, based on presented literature, that government-citizen accountability is key to good governance, wellbeing and development, I constructed a multi-item index to measure and rank contemporary government-to-citizen accountability in 54 African countries included in the IIAG dataset. The aim was to determine the state of political accountability in the continent given three decades since the fight against corruption gained momentum. The index was constructed using five indicators of government-to-citizen accountability from the 2020 Ibrahim Index of African Governance. The selected indicators were examined using the correlation coefficient, Cronbach's reliability analysis, and the principal component analysis. The examination did not reveal any glaring reasons not to combine the five indicators.

Following a check for skewness using the standard deviation, skew, and kurtosis values for the indicators in Table 1, the items were transformed to a common scale (0.0 to 1.0) and combined into an index by calculating their unweighted arithmetic mean. Mauritius scored highest on political accountability on the index and was trailed by Tunisia and Burkina Faso. Eritrea scored lowest, just before Equatorial Guinea and South Sudan. These findings were strengthened by other relevant literature presented in the research that adduce the existence of weak political institutions and structures in African countries, particularly Eritrea. The mapped index scores revealed that most of the countries that had high levels of political accountability were in West Africa, while all Middle African countries (apart from Gabon) and North African countries (apart from Tunisia) had low levels of accountability. Overall, the index mean revealed that government-to-citizen accountability is brittle in Africa despite three decades since the fight against graft gained traction at country, regional, and continental levels in Africa.

There is, therefore, a need to review the strategies used to fight corruption at continental, regional and national levels. At the regional and continental level, it is recommended that policymakers should design and implement more tailored anti-graft policies and programmes as opposed to implementing a single strategy for combating corruption and instituting accountability. At the national level, it is recommended that the operational and administrative framework of

anti-corruption agencies should be reviewed and strengthened to ensure that ethical considerations take primacy in the operations of such agencies. Further, robust feedback mechanisms should be instituted in such agencies to ensure that accountability is generated in the implementation of anti-graft initiatives, especially from officials and programme implementers, if the projects they put in place fail to produce results.

Lastly, the political accountability index is strengthened by the strong positive association, high raw-alpha, common variance of the component measures and the validity check, but limited by the four countries with missing values.

Biographical details

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